Financial development, structure and growth: new data, method and results by Luintel, Kul B. et al.
Cardiff Economics Working Papers
Working Paper No. E2016/2
Financial Development, Structure and Growth: New
Data, Method and Results
Kul B Luintel, Mosahid Khan, Roberto Leon-Gonzalez
and GuangJie Li
March 2016
ISSN 1749–6101
Cardiff Business School
Aberconway Building
Colum Drive
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
t: +44 (0)29 2087 4000
f: +44 (0)29 2087 4419
business.cardiff.ac.uk
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be published
in due course, in revised form, and should not be quoted or cited without the author’s written permission.
Cardiff Economics Working Papers are available online from:
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cdfwpaper/ and
business.cardiff.ac.uk/research/economics/working-papers
Enquiries: EconWP@cardiff.ac.uk
Financial Development, Structure and Growth: New Data, Method and Results 
 
Kul B Luintel*, Mosahid Khan, Roberto Leon-Gonzalez and Guangjie Li  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The existing weight of evidence suggests that financial structure (the classification of a financial 
system as bank-based versus market-based) is irrelevant for economic growth. This contradicts 
the common belief that the institutional structure of a financial system matters. We re-examine 
this issue using a novel dataset covering 69 countries over 1989-2011 in a Bayesian framework. 
Our results are conformable to the belief - a market-based system is relevant - with sizable 
economic effects for the high-income but not for the middle-and-low-income countries. Our 
findings provide a counterexample to the weight of evidence. We also identify a regime shift in 
2008.  
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Financial Development, Structure and Growth: New Data, Method and Results 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely presumed that the institutional structure of a financial system is important. 
This is why the role of financial structure on corporate governance and economic growth has 
been debated over centuries. According to Allen and Gale (2001), this debate dates back to the 
early 18th century South Sea Bubble of the UK and the Mississippi Bubble of France, which 
prompted discussions about corporate governance and financial stability, hence the debate on 
bank-based versus market-based financial systems. Subsequently, Gerschenkron (1962) and 
Goldsmith (1969) elaborated on the potential role of financial structure on economic growth. 
Ever since, an extensive body of literature has evolved on this issue culminating in bank-based, 
market-based, financial services, law-and-finance and reputation-and-relationships views.  
The financial structure of a country is a blend of financial institutions, instruments, 
markets and the rules governing the financial system and contracts. However, in the development 
finance literature, the financial structure is defined by the relative weight (size and activities) of 
intermediaries and capital market in the country’s financial sector. A financial system is defined 
as bank-based if the relative share (size and/or activities) of intermediaries is bigger than the 
capital market; the system is termed market-based if the share of capital market is bigger. 
Although the forms and roles of financial intermediaries and capital markets may differ 
markedly across countries, nonetheless this classification of bank- and market-based financial 
systems, widely used in the literature, does represent different financial structures, albeit in a 
narrow and highly aggregated sense. In Section 3 we outline the standard measures of financial 
structures.  
The bank-based view argues that intermediaries are superior to financial markets in 
fostering resource allocation and economic growth. This view emphasizes, among others things, 
the relationship banking (the long term lender-borrower relationship) and banks’ ability to 
alleviate asymmetric information and adverse selection. Banks’ ex post monitoring of 
investments is seen to reduce moral hazards and banks are also perceived to address agency 
problems and short-termism (Stiglitz, 1985). Moreover, banks are the sole source of external 
finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which have no access to capital markets. 1 
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In contrast, the market-based view perceives capital markets as superior to intermediaries 
in fostering corporate governance, resource allocation and economic growth. The basic argument 
is that large, liquid and well-functioning markets facilitate risk management and risk reductions 
through diversification. Capital markets are also superior to banks in funding new ideas 
(projects), research and development (R&D) and venture capital (Allen and Gale, 1999), which 
are vital in raising productivity and competitiveness.  
The financial services view, on the other hand, stresses both banks and capital markets, 
arguing that they provide complementary financial services. In any case, the dichotomy between 
bank- and market-based financial systems is not mutually exclusive. The financial systems 
designated as market-based (e.g., UK and US) do have global banks and those designated as 
bank-based (e.g., Germany and Japan) also have sizable and well-functioning capital markets. 
Intermediaries often play pivotal roles in financial markets as issuers and buyers of securities and 
hence are key market infrastructures. Likewise, capital markets play an important role in raising 
capital through new issues and provide a platform for secondary trading which ensures liquidity. 
Therefore, according to the financial services view, what matters for productivity and growth is 
the provision and effective delivery of financial services by the financial system (inclusive of 
intermediaries and markets). 
A related strand of literature is the law-and-finance view. Legal scholars (e.g., Reynolds 
and Flores, 1989) classify the genesis of commercial legal systems of different countries into 
three main legal families, namely, the English Common Law, the French Civil Law and the 
German Civil Law. This school argues that the protection of outside investors against 
expropriations by insiders is fundamental for sound corporate governance and financial 
development to foster the finance-growth nexus. This view, therefore, emphasizes the legal 
provisions – laws governing contract, company, securities, bankruptcy, takeover, competition etc. 
– and their enforcement quality. 2 
One exception to the law-and-finance view, however, is Allen et al. (2005). They show 
that China rates poorly vis-à-vis legal provisions and enforcement mechanisms, quality of 
government, corruption in government, and institutions and investor protection, compared to 
other emerging countries, including those in La Porta et al. (1998). Yet the Chinese economy is 
growing rapidly, mainly fueled by the growth of small private sector family firms (enterprises). 
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According to Allen et al. (2005), the Chinese growth experience is an important 
“counterexample” to the extant findings of the law-finance-and-growth literature. They argue 
that Confucian beliefs have led to high social trusts in China, enabling the development of 
alternative financing and governance mechanisms based on reputation-and-relationships.  
The theoretical controversy, as Langfield and Pagano (2016, p. 62) neatly put it, “….has 
not established a clear-cut prediction regarding the superiority of bank-based or market-based 
finance in promoting the efficient allocation of funding, and thus on economic performances”. 
Hence, the battle is fought on empirical grounds. Historically, this debate is empirically 
scrutinized by taking the US and UK as the standard-bearers of market-based financial systems 
versus Japan and Germany as the stalwarts of bank-based systems. As stated elsewhere (e.g., 
Goldsmith, 1969; Beck and Levine, 2002), the problem with this type of empirical scrutiny is 
that both pairs of countries are developed economies and they exhibit similar long-run growth 
rates. Therefore, when countries with bank-based (Germany and Japan) and market-based (the 
UK and US) financial systems achieve similar levels of development and growth rates, then little 
can be dispensed on the role of their differing financial structures. 
This narrow empirical focus – i.e., the comparative study of the UK and US versus the 
German and the Japanese financial systems – in evaluating the role of financial structure on 
corporate governance and economic growth has taken a significant turn over the last two decades 
or so. A voluminous work by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, Maksimovic and their collaborators 
– culminating in several influential journal articles and book volumes – examines the role of 
financial development and financial structure on (i) long-run economic growth, (ii) industrial 
growth and (iii) the creation of new firms by analyzing cross-country, cross-country-and-cross-
industry and firm-level data in panel and/or cross-sectional frameworks (some of the major 
references are cited in footnote 1). They consistently report that financial structure (the 
classification of the financial system as bank-based versus market-based) is immaterial 
(insignificant) for economic growth, industrial growth and the creation of new firms across a 
large array of sample countries. Instead, they find that the level of overall financial development 
– an aggregate measure of capital market and intermediaries which proxies the financial services 
view – is significant. Hence, they conclude that their findings are supportive of the financial 
services view which emphasizes the role of financial services offered by the financial system 
collectively (Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 2002). The time series study of Luintel et al. 
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(2008), which examines the role of financial structure and financial development utilizing similar 
measures and specifications but addressing the non-stationarity in the data, does find evidence of 
financial structure significantly explaining economic growth, but these types of study are 
relatively sparse. 
The law-and-finance view is extensively scrutinized by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny and their collaborators who have produced a large body of influential 
literature (references in footnote 2).  They consistently report that the highest protection for 
outside investors is provided by the common law countries followed by the German civil law 
countries; the French civil law countries provide the least protection. They report that common 
law countries have (i) bigger stock markets relative to their GDP, (ii) more listed firms per 
millions of people, (iii) more Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) relative to GDP and (iv) less 
concentrated ownership, compared to the French civil law countries. Their results confirm that 
investors’ protection enables financial sector development which in turn stimulates the real 
economy. Hence, their policy prescription is to focus on better laws and enforcement 
mechanisms, which contributes to the development of the financial sector and hence the finance-
growth nexus.  
Some exceptions notwithstanding, the weight of evidence has been that financial 
structure is not significant in explaining economic growth. This refutes the wide presumption 
that the institutional structure of a financial system matters. These findings also pose an 
important policy dilemma vis-à-vis the institutional structure of a country’s financial system. In 
this context, we reinvestigate this contentious issue of the irrelevance of financial structure vis-à-
vis economic growth by (i) utilizing a recently released novel dataset and (ii) proposing some 
advances in econometric (investigation) methodology. For any multicountry empirical study, 
which encompasses a large number of countries, the quality and consistency of data is vital for 
the reliability of its results. Indeed, Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013; hereafter 
CDFL, 2013) have recently made available a thoroughly revised and updated dataset on financial 
development and structure for a large number of countries which we utilize.3 They state that “All 
indicators have been recalculated for the entire time period to ensure higher quality and 
consistency over time.” When we compile and compare the different measures of financial 
development and structures based on this new dataset with those used in the previous literature 
(e.g., Levine, 2002) we find striking differences in these measures across countries (see Section 
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3). We analyze a full panel of 69 countries, along with separate panels of 33 high-income and 36 
middle-and-low-income countries. This dataset spans 1989-2011 and covers the recent financial 
crisis. The global financial crisis of 2008, which has led to a prolonged recession, has been a 
wake-up call to both bankers and policy makers. In this context, an interesting issue would be to 
examine whether the global financial crisis has impacted structural shift in the relationship 
between financial development, structure and economic growth. We also investigate this issue.  
Methodologically, we extend the panel dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator 
(Stock and Watson, 1993; Kao and Chiang, 2000) to a Bayesian framework. Our extension 
allows for multiple breaks in unknown locations. To our knowledge, almost all empirical 
literature (definitely all those cited above) on this issue is based on the frequentist approach. The 
Bayesian approach is shown to be a powerful method to estimate models with an unknown 
number of structural breaks (e.g. Pesaran et al., 2006), which squares nicely with investigating 
the episodes of structural breaks or regime shifts in the relationship. The clear advantages are 
that: (i) we obtain credible parameter (e.g. cointegrating vectors) estimates and confidence 
intervals that are robust to the presence of breaks, (ii) the use of a transition equation implies that 
we have a prior for the parameters after the break that is centered on the parameters before the 
break which improves efficiency, and (iii) it enables us to deal with the large number of possible 
break locations that arise when the number of breaks is unknown.4 We thus hope to extend the 
econometric methodology and take the empirical literature on the link between financial 
development, structure and economic growth in a new direction. 
Our study complements some of the recent studies in this field. In an interesting paper, 
Langfield and Pagano (2016) show that the European financial system has become more bank-
based since the mid-1990s which has increased systemic risk intensity at the bank-level and 
adversely affected economic growth. They also report that banking crises and stock market crises 
tend to amplify these adverse effects on systemic risk and growth, and more so in the bank-based 
financial systems. They focus on the role of disproportionately large banks in the run up to the 
financial crisis and its propagation, whereas we focus on re-examining the weight of evidence on 
the irrelevance of financial structure – which has hitherto directly contradicted the widely held 
belief that financial structure should matter for growth – in the light of new data and methods. 
Further, Langfield and Pagano analyze 20 countries whereas we analyze a much larger sample 
(69 countries). Gambacorta et al. (2014) also report different yet non-monotonic effects of 
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intermediaries (bank credit to GDP ratio) and markets (stock market turnover to GDP ratio) on 
economic growth. Again, our country coverage, data, specification and empirical approach are 
different from theirs. Finally, Arcand et al. (2015) report that the effect of financial depth on 
economic growth is an inverted U-shape. They estimate credit thresholds of 80% - 100% of GDP 
beyond which financial depth is found to be inversely related to economic growth. These are 
interesting findings in their own right, yet the focus is on the effects of financial depth (measured 
by total credit or bank credit to GDP ratios) on economic growth, whereas we focus on the issue 
of financial structure, development and growth. Our paper complements these recent studies by 
documenting further new results vis-à-vis the nexus between financial development, structure 
and economic growth.  
A brief preview of our results is in order. We find a long-run equilibrating (cointegrating) 
relationship between the variables that tie real income levels to financial development and 
structure. We find that financial structure matters for the group of high-income countries; all 
assessed structure measures contribute positively and significantly to income levels in the long 
run with sizable economic effects. Interestingly, results do not support the financial services 
view. Both of these findings are in sharp contrast to the voluminous empirical literature (the 
weight of evidence discussed above) which reports quite the opposite – i.e., the significance of 
the financial services but the insignificance of the financial structure. In contrast to the high-
income group, financial structure has virtually no significance in the middle-and-low-income 
countries. This difference in results between the high and low income groups is consistent with 
the findings of Rioja and Valev (2004) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) who also report 
different effects of financial development across high and low income groups of countries.  We 
find one structural break (regime shift) in the year 2008 in the panel of high-income countries 
which we attribute to the recent financial crisis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The following section specifies the empirical model and outlines the econometric methodology. 
Section 3 covers the data; Section 4 presents empirical results; Section 5 briefly discusses 
robustness issues and Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Specification and the Bayesian Approach to Panel Cointegration with Multiple Breaks 
 
2.1 Model Specification 
 
Our empirical specification for testing the relationship between financial structure, 
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financial development and economic growth follows the standard approach in the literature (see 
for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Levine, 2002; Luintel et al., 2008; to name 
but a few). Typically, in a non-stationary setup, the real GDP per capita is specified as the 
response variable (regressand) and the levels of per capita physical capital stock, and the separate 
measures of financial structure and development as the covariates (regressors).5 The DOLS 
specification of our empirical panel model, under the Bayesian framework, which allows for 
multiple breaks (shifts) in the cointegrating parameters at unknown locations, is: 
𝒚𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜸𝟏𝒊 + 𝒕𝜸𝟐𝒊 + 𝒕
𝟐𝜸𝟑𝒊 + ∑ 𝜸𝟒𝒊𝒋𝜟𝒌𝒊,𝒕+𝒋
𝒅𝟐
𝒋=−𝒅𝟏
+ ∑ 𝜸𝟓𝒊𝒋𝜟𝒇𝒅𝒊,𝒕+𝒋 + ∑ 𝜸𝟔𝒊𝒋𝜟𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕+𝒋
𝒅𝟐
𝒋=−𝒅𝟏
𝒅𝟐
𝒋=−𝒅𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟏𝒕𝒌𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒕𝒇𝒅𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒕𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕, 𝜺𝒊,𝒕~𝒊. 𝒊. 𝒅. 𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈
𝟐), 
 
(1) 
 
where 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝑵;  𝒕 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝑻; 𝒚𝒊,𝒕 is the log real per capita output (GDP), 𝒌𝒊,𝒕 is the log of 
per capita physical capital stock, 𝒇𝒅𝒊,𝒕 and 𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕 respectively are measures of financial 
development and financial structure, 𝒅𝟏 and 𝒅𝟐 are non-negative scalars denoting the orders of 
lags and leads respectively, and 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 is the error term which follows a normal distribution with 
mean 0 and 𝝈𝟐 variance. We assume that all cross-sectional units have a common cointegrating 
vector 𝜷𝒕 = (𝜷𝟏𝒕, 𝜷𝟐𝒕, 𝜷𝟑𝒕)′ which is time varying. The other coefficients in equation (1) are 
heterogeneous across i but time-invariant. Financial structure is measured such that a rise in 𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕  
implies an increased weight (share) of capital markets relative to intermediaries, dubbed a 
market-based financial system in the literature (measures of 𝒇𝒅𝒊,𝒕 and 𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕 are discussed in 
Section 3). A close look at the country-specific data indicates that some of these variables may 
not be linearly trended, as is normally assumed. We show some of these plots in the Online 
Appendix, Figure 1. Hence, we allow for a quadratic trend in equation (1). At the estimation 
stage, the order of lags and leads as well as the inclusion of deterministic components (a constant 
and a linear or a quadratic trend) for each of our specifications is statistically identified through 
the predictive likelihood (Geweke, 1996). Specification (1) models the role of the financial 
structure on real per capita income while controlling for the potential effects of the overall 
financial development and per capita physical capital stock. This specification is in the tradition 
of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function augmented by measures of financial 
development and financial structure; the latter two variables are viewed to capture the total factor 
productivity (TFP).  
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Levine (2002) clearly lays out the parametric restrictions implied by the bank-based, 
market-based and financial services views vis-à-vis equation (1). The market-based view 
predicts that both capital markets and the overall financial development are conducive for output 
and growth. Since financial structure is measured such that a rise in 𝒇𝒔𝒊,𝒕 implies a more market-
based financial system, the predictions of market-based view imply a priori 2,t 0   and 3,t 0  . 
In contrast, the bank-based view maintains that economies grow faster and achieve a higher level 
of income in a developed financial system that is intermediary-based, implying 2,t 0   and
3,t
0  . The financial services view, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of overall financial 
development and de-emphasizes the bank-based versus market-based distinction, implying 
3,t
0  and 2,t 0  .  
Equation (1) forms the basis of our empirical assessment. We have different measures of 
financial variables (more details provided in Section 3) which include: finance size (FZ) and 
activities (FA), structure size (SZ) and activities (SA) and the measures of finance aggregate (FAG) 
and structure aggregate (SAG). These measures capture different aspects of financial activities, 
hence are important. In our empirical work, we permit all possible combinations of these 
measures in the framework of equation (1) and evaluate the role of financial development and 
structure on economic growth. These combinations generate nine empirical specifications, for 
each panel, by pairing different measures of ,i tfd and ,i tfs as: (i) F
AG and SAG, (ii) FAG and SA, 
(iii) FAG and SZ, (iv) SAG and FZ, (v) SAG and FA, (vi) SA and FZ, (vii) SA and FA, (viii) SZ and FZ, 
and (ix) SZ and FA. Thus, we estimate and report 27 models for three panels of sample countries.  
In these specifications, we allow the cointegrating vector ( t ) to be time varying to capture any 
shift in the cointegrating parameters. Its evolution process is: 
 𝛽𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡𝑢𝑡, (2) 
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where 𝐵𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether period t is a break (𝐵𝑡 = 1) or not (𝐵𝑡 = 0) and 
𝑢𝑡 = (𝑢1𝑡, 𝑢2𝑡 , 𝑢3𝑡)′ is the difference between 𝛽𝑡+1  and 𝛽𝑡  when period t is a break. Let 𝛾𝑖 =
(𝛾1𝑖, 𝛾2𝑖, 𝛾3𝑖, 𝛾4𝑖,−𝑑1 , … , 𝛾4𝑖,𝑑2 , 𝛾5𝑖,−𝑑1 , … , 𝛾5𝑖,𝑑2 , 𝛾6𝑖,−𝑑1 , … , 𝛾6𝑖,𝑑2)
′
 so that the parameters to be 
estimated are 𝛾𝑖  (for i=1,2,…,N), 𝛽1, 𝜎
2, 𝑢𝑡 , and 𝐵𝑡  ( 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1 ). We specify prior 
distributions for these parameters as follows: 
 𝒑(𝜸𝒊, 𝝈
𝟐) ∝
𝟏
𝝈𝟐
, (3) 
 𝜷𝟏|𝝈
𝟐~𝑵(𝟎, 𝝉𝝈𝟐𝑰𝟑), (4) 
 𝑢𝑗𝑡|𝜎𝑢𝑗
2 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2 ), 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2 ~𝐼𝐺(0.1,3), 𝑗 = 1,2,3.  (5) 
 
Equation (3) implies a flat prior for 𝛾𝑖 and the commonly used non-informative Jeffreys prior 
for 𝜎2 (e.g. Koop, 2003, p. 38). The conditional prior of 𝛽1 on 𝜎
2 is the initial distribution which 
is normal with 𝜏𝜎2𝐼3 as the variance. We choose a very high value of   (𝜏 = 10
5 ) in our 
estimation so that the prior of 𝛽1 becomes virtually non-informative, letting the data speak. The 
prior for 𝑢𝑡 is normal and the prior for its variance, 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2  , is an inverted gamma. We choose the 
prior mean of 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2  to be 0.1 and the degrees of freedom parameter to be 3, so that the prior 
variance is infinite. Note that 𝑢𝑡 measures the difference between the cointegrating parameters of 
two regimes when period t is a break point. We expect the step change (i.e., the magnitude of 𝑢𝑡) 
to range between 0 and 1 because economically most parameter estimates (point elasticities) are 
expected to be within this range. This is why we have chosen the prior mean of 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2  to be 0.1, 
which ensures that  𝛽𝑡 varies between 0 and 1.  
Regarding the prior for the break indicator 𝐵𝑡 we follow Li (2015) to specify a prior that 
allows for an unknown number of breaks at unknown locations. The unknown number of breaks 
ranges from 0 to T-1 and is specified as:  
 
𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝟏 = 𝟏|𝑫) =
𝟏
𝑫
, 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒕 = 𝟏|𝑩𝟏:(𝒕−𝟏), 𝑫) =
𝟏
𝑫−(𝒕−𝟏)+∑ 𝑩𝒋
𝒕−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏
,  
(6) 
 
 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝟏 = 𝟎|𝑫) = 𝟏 − 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝟏 = 𝟏|𝑫) , 
𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒕 = 𝟎|𝑩𝟏:(𝒕−𝟏), 𝑫) = 𝟏 − 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒕 = 𝟏|𝑩𝟏:(𝒕−𝟏), 𝑫),                              
(7) 
(8) 
where, t=2,…, T-1,  𝐵1:(𝑡−1) = (𝐵1, … , 𝐵𝑡−1)′ and 𝐷 ≥ 𝑇 is a hyperparameter which controls 
prior information about the number of breaks. This prior is inspired by the seminal work of Chib 
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(1998) and is similar to that specified more recently in Koop and Potter (2009). Large values of 
𝐷 imply few break points whereas small values imply many breaks. Note that our prior implies 
that the elements of 𝐵1:(𝑇−1) are not independent, because the probability of a break does depend 
on the number of breaks that have occurred previously.  Also, as Li (2015) points out, for a fixed 
𝐷 the prior probability 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑡 = 1|𝐷), which is marginal over the previous periods, increases 
with t. We find that with a small value of  𝐷 the prior shows a very pronounced upward trend, 
whereas with a high value of 𝐷 the pattern appears very flat (we show these plots of marginal 
priors in Figure 2 of the Online Appendix). Following Li (2015), we treat 𝐷 as an unknown 
parameter to be estimated and specify a uniform prior for D over the interval [𝑇, 5𝑇], such that 
the prior density can be written as: 
 𝒑(𝑫) =
𝑰(𝑻≤𝑫≤𝟓𝑻)
𝟒𝑻
, (9) 
where 𝐼(. ) is an indicator function. The uniform prior for 𝐷 implies that the prior of 𝐵𝑡, 
unconditional on 𝐷, is  
 
𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝟏 = 𝟏) =
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝟓)
𝟒𝑻
, 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒕 = 𝟏|𝑩𝟏:(𝒕−𝟏)) =
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (
𝟓𝑻−(𝒕−𝟏)+∑ 𝑩𝒋
𝒕−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏
𝑻−(𝒕−𝟏)+∑ 𝑩𝒋
𝒕−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏
)
𝟒𝑻
. 
(10) 
The computed marginal prior 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑡 = 1), which is unconditional on the previous periods, 
implied by (10) is also shown in the Online Appendix, Figure 2. The prior probability of a break 
at any point ranges from 0.018 to 0.04. Our strategy is to calculate the posterior probability of 
𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑡 = 1|𝑦) and compare it with the prior. Whenever this probability is much higher than the 
prior we can conclude that there is strong evidence of a break. Note that the model in equation 
(1) assumes common break dates for all the cross-sectional units. Change point panel models 
with common break dates allow consistent estimations of break locations (see Bai, 2010). If the 
assumption of common break dates is not realistic a priori then one can separate the sample into 
more homogeneous cross-sectional groups, such that the common break hypothesis becomes 
more plausible. Our country grouping into high-income and low-and-middle-income panels is 
one way to address this issue. 
2.2 Computation and Model Comparison 
 
To describe our algorithm for computations, let 𝜃 be a vector containing the unknown parameters 
of interest and let y denote all the observed data. Our algorithm simulates draws from the 
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posterior distribution 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) through a Gibbs sampler. Since the parameters of interest are the 
cointegrating vectors and the structural break indicators (𝐵𝑡), we first integrate out the parameter 
𝛾𝑖 from the posterior distribution and obtain simulated draws only for the remaining parameters. 
There are two blocks of parameters in our Gibb sampler, (𝐵1:(𝑇−1)′, 𝑢′, 𝛽1′) and (𝐷, 𝜎
2, 𝜎𝑢
2), 
where 𝜎𝑢
2 = (𝜎𝑢1
2 , 𝜎𝑢2
2 , 𝜎𝑢3
2 ). Each block of parameters is drawn conditional on the other using the 
conditional posterior distributions. The details of our simulation scheme are given in the Online 
Appendix. We used 100,000 iterations to estimate each of the models. Results using different 
starting points led to very similar results, indicating good convergence.  
In order to determine the number of leads and lags in equation (1), as well as the 
specification of the trend, we use the predictive likelihood criterion proposed by Geweke (1996) 
for all 27 models. The predictive likelihood assesses the fit of the model to the data by evaluating 
the quality of out of the sample density forecasts. Essentially, this involves estimating the model 
for an initial sample ),...,(
00 1:1 TT
yyy  , and defining the predictive likelihood as the predictive 
distribution evaluated for the rest of the sample ),...,( 1:)1( 00 TTTT yyy   . By denoting the collection 
of parameters up to period t  by t , the predictive likelihood is defined as: 
 
𝑝𝑇0
𝑇 = 𝑝(𝑦(𝑇0+1):𝑇|𝑦1:𝑇0) = ∫ 𝑝(𝑦(𝑇0+1):𝑇|𝜃𝑇 , 𝑦1:𝑇0)𝑝(𝜃𝑇|𝜃𝑇0 , 𝑦1:𝑇0)𝑝(𝜃𝑇0|𝑦1:𝑇0)𝑑𝜃𝑇 
(11) 
This quantity can be calculated as described in the appendix. The larger the value of the 
predictive likelihood, the better the fit. When 00 T  the predictive likelihood coincides with the 
marginal likelihood (e.g. Koop, 2003, p. 24).  However, for moderate values of 0T the predictive 
likelihood is less sensitive to the specification of the prior. We set the maximum number of lags 
and leads to be 1, 𝑇0 = 15 and choose the specification based on the highest value of the log of 
predictive likelihood.6   
3. Data Sources and Description  
We analyze a panel of 69 countries for which complete data series on the relevant 
financial variables of intermediaries and capital markets exist. The raw data series are obtained 
from CDFL (2013). This is a new and extensively revised and updated dataset which ensures 
‘higher quality’ and ‘consistency over time’. Although this dataset covers 203 jurisdictions 
across the world, data for most countries, especially the stock market variables, are either 
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incomplete or are only available for a relatively short sample period. In fact, data on stock 
market variables only go as far back as 1989 and we identify 69 countries with complete datasets 
for 1989-2011, hence our sample. Following the World Bank classification (2013), these 69 
countries consist of 33 high-income and 36 middle-and-low-income countries. We model them 
as three panels of – (i) full sample (69), (ii) high-income (33) and (iii) middle-and-low-income 
(36) – countries. 7 Literature (Rioja and Valev,  2004;  Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) reports 
different effects of financial development across industrialized and emerging countries, hence 
our separate analyses of three panels is consistent with the literature. By analyzing these three 
separate panels, we are able to reveal important differences in the role of financial development 
and structure between groups of countries that are at different stages of development and income 
levels. 
We have a balanced panel of 1587 observations (country years) for the full sample; 759 
observations for the high-income panel and 828 observations for the panel of middle-and-low-
income countries. The relevant stock market and intermediary variables for this analysis include: 
stock market capitalization ratio (value of listed shares / GDP), stock market total value traded 
ratio (total shares traded on stock market exchange / GDP), stock market turnover ratio (value of 
total shares traded / average market capitalization) and private credit ratio (private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions / GDP), all of which are obtained from 
CDFL (2013).  
We compute the standard measures of financial development and structure following the 
main stream literature (Beck and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2002; Luintel et al., 2008). Financial 
structure measures include Structure-Activity (SA) and Structure-Size (SZ). SA is the ratio of 
stock market total value traded to private credit (by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions) and SZ is the ratio of stock market capitalization to private credit. SA measures the 
stock market trading activity relative to intermediaries’ lending to the private sector, whereas SZ 
measures the stock market capitalization (size) relative to intermediaries’ lending. These size and 
activity measures are important because a stock market of a bigger size (large listings) does not 
always mean that it is actively trading and vice versa. An aggregate measure of financial 
structure (SAG), which encapsulates activities and the size of capital market relative to 
intermediaries, is proxied by the first principal component of SA and SZ. Indicators of financial 
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development, inclusive of capital markets and intermediaries, are Finance-Activity (FA) and 
Finance-Size (FZ). FA, which captures the activities of capital market and intermediaries jointly, 
is measured as the log of the product of private credit ratio (credit to private sector by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions to GDP) and stock market value traded ratio. 
Likewise, FZ, which measures the size of the country’s financial sector relative to the size of its 
economy, is the log of the product of the private credit ratio of deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions and stock market capitalization ratio. The overall (aggregate) financial 
development (FAG), which captures the sizes and activities of markets and intermediaries, is 
measured by the first principal component of FZ and FA. All these measures are standard in the 
literature. 
Data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), GDP 
deflator, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate and population are obtained from the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Nominal GDP and GFCF variables are 
deflated by the GDP deflator and expressed in 2005 PPP US dollars ($). Consistent data on total 
physical capital stock are unavailable for all sample countries; therefore, we compute this series 
for each country in the sample by integrating the time series on respective real GFCF through the 
perpetual inventory method. Following Luintel and Khan (2004) and Luintel et al. (2008), 
amongst others, a depreciation rate of 8% and the sample-average growth rate of real GFCF are 
used to compute the initial capital stock.     
Table 1 near here 
Table 1 reports the country-by-country descriptive statistics of some of the main variables 
of our dataset. High-income countries (Panel A) have an average income of $28,791, which is 
fivefold higher than that of middle-and-low-income countries ($5,754). In the high-income 
group, Luxembourg has by far the highest per capita income of $58,001 followed by Norway 
($42,039) and the US ($39,385); Hungary ($14,484) has the lowest income per capita in this 
group. The Republic of Korea (4.8%), Singapore (3.9%), Trinidad and Tobago (3.5%) and Hong 
Kong (3%) record high average annual growth rates during the sample period, whereas 
Switzerland (0.8%), Japan (0.9%), the US (1.4%) and the UK (1.5%) show quite modest growth 
rates. In the middle-and-low-income group, the real per capita income ranges between the 
highest of $12,730 (Argentina) and the lowest of $1,010 (Bangladesh). In this group of countries, 
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the highest average annual growth rate is achieved by China (9.2%), followed by India (4.8%) 
and Sri Lanka (4.4%). The middle-and-low-income group shows an average annual growth rate 
of 2.5% during the sample period of 23 years which is higher than that of the high-income group 
(1.7%).  However, 14 of the middle-and-low-income countries grew by less than 2% a year 
during the sample period and one of them (Côte d'Ivoire) recorded a negative growth rate. It is 
evident that there are significant differences in income levels and growth rates amongst countries 
within and across these two panels. 
As expected, on average, the size and activity of the financial sector is bigger in high-
income countries than in the middle-and-low-income countries relative to the size of their 
economies. Within the high-income group, small and open countries – Hong Kong (4.5), 
Switzerland (3.36), Luxembourg (2.72) and Singapore (2.56) – have a very large financial sector 
relative to the size of their economies (FZ: see notes to Table 1) and so are the financial sectors of 
some of the big industrialized countries, such as the US (2.69), UK (2.60) and Canada (2.09). 
Oman has the smallest financial sector (FZ = 0.55) amongst the sample of high-income countries.  
Finance activity (FA) appears highest in Hong Kong (3.68) followed by the US (3.26), 
Switzerland (3.14), Japan (2.52) and the UK (2.45). In fact, the US shows the highest degree of 
financial activities relative to the size of the financial sector (compare FA and FZ). Only six of the 
middle-income countries in our sample (Chile, China, Jordan, Malaysia, South Africa and 
Thailand) have a financial sector that is larger than the size of their economy (FZ>1); the rest of 
the sample countries in Panel B have financial sectors that are smaller than the size of their 
economy (i.e., FZ<1). 
Structure size (SZ) measures the size of capital market relative to the intermediaries; the 
sample average SZ is largest in Hong Kong (2.09) followed by Singapore (1.57), Kuwait (1.46), 
Finland (1.33) and Luxembourg (1.32) in the high-income group of countries. Cyprus has the 
smallest SZ of 0.18. The UK (0.95) and the US (0.68), dubbed market-based financial systems, 
appear to have a structure size of smaller than unity. Levine (2002) reported SZ measures of 0.90 
and 1.02, respectively for the US and the UK. This revised new dataset shows a rather low 
structure size for the US.  Germany and Japan, respectively, have structure size measures of 0.35 
and 0.42, which appear consistent with their characterization as having the bank-based financial 
systems. 
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Ignoring Bangladesh and Kenya (which are classed as low-income countries and have a 
structure size of below unity), only 13 of the 34 middle-income sample countries – i.e., 38% of 
the sample cohort – have a structure size of above unity, signifying capital market activities 
being dominant over the intermediaries in these countries. Interestingly, this proportion is even 
smaller in the high-income panel – only 30% (10 out of 33) of sample countries have a structure 
size of above unity. The fact that 38% of the middle-income counties have a structure size of 
above unity may be explained by the relatively small size of their intermediaries rather than these 
countries having more developed capital markets. Five of the 33 high-income countries (i.e., 
15%) have a structure activity measure of above unity, whereas only 3 out of 36 (i.e., 8%) 
middle-and-low-income countries have a structure activity of above unity. Overall, the size and 
activities of intermediaries appear to dominate those of the capital market in the majority of 
countries across both the high-income and middle-income groups.  
How different is this new dataset from those analyzed by the previous literature? In order 
to shed some light on this aspect, we report comparable measures of SA, SZ and FA computed 
from the current dataset and those used by Levine (2002) for 20 of our common sample 
countries. Table 2 reports these comparative measures. Our computations are defined in the notes 
to Table 1 and we take anti-log of the numbers reported in Tables I and II of Levine (2002) as 
they are log values. 
Table 2 near here 
It is evident that there are striking differences in these measures of financial development 
and structure between the previously used and this new dataset across the vast majority of 
sample countries. For example, our (Levine’s, 2002) measure of SA is 0.96 (0.54) for US, 0.73 
(0.48) for UK, 1.00 (0.68) for Switzerland, 0.41 (0.21) for Germany, 0.54 (0.10) for France, 0.61 
(0.31) for Australia, 1.22 (0.20) for India and 1.16 (0.08) for Pakistan. Of the 20 common sample 
countries, only Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Japan show a close resemblance to the measures 
of SA between these two datasets. Significant differences are also evident in the measures of SZ 
and FA between these two datasets. 8 Overall, there are important differences between the 
previously used and this new dataset which reinforces our earlier argument that the relationship 
between financial development, structure and economic growth necessities re-examination using 
(exploiting) this new dataset (information). 
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4. Empirical Results 
We begin by testing if our panel datasets are non-stationary unit root processes through a 
range of standard panel unit root tests. The Levin et al. (2002) and Breitung (2000) t-tests test the 
null of the unit root in the panel under the assumption of a common unit root process across 
panel units. Both of these tests cannot reject the null of the unit root in any of the variables across 
all three panels. The PP-Fisher Chi square (Maddala and Wu, 1999) test assumes individual unit 
root processes, which also confirms that all data series are unit root processes. Furthermore, 
Hadri’s (2000) test strongly rejects the null of stationarity in all cases. Panel unit root tests are 
implemented with a constant and linear time trend in the specification, and are robust up to a 
third order lag. Results of unit root tests are not reported to conserve space but are available on 
request. Given that panel data are unit root processes, we employ the group-ADF statistic of 
Pedroni (1999) to test if our models are cointegrated. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 near here 
Panel cointegration tests clearly reject the null of no cointegration in all nine 
specifications across all the three panels at the 5% significance level or better. In fact, in 26 of 
the 27 cases (models), the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 1% significance level. These 
results confirm that all empirical specifications are cointegrated. We apply the DOLS estimator 
in the Bayesian framework, as explained above, to estimate the parameters of cointegrating 
vectors. DOLS addresses the issues of endogeneity and residual serial correlation in the 
regression equation, which are important for reliable inferences.  
Table 4 near here 
Table 4 reports the results of cointegrating parameters estimated by DOLS under the 
Bayesian method for the full sample period, 1989-2011, without structural breaks, and Tables 5-
6 present results regarding breaks. Each model follows the specification structure (leads, lags and 
deterministic components) based on the highest value of the predictive likelihood, as discussed in 
Section 2.2 (results of predictive likelihood are reported in the Online Appendix Table A1). 
Table 4 contains three set of results: the high-income group (Panel A), the middle-and-low-
income group (Panel B) and the full sample of countries (Panel C). Results are striking. All three 
measures of financial structure (SAG, SA and SZ) appear with positive and significant coefficients 
for the panel of rich countries (i.e., zero is outside the 95% credible interval). The significance of 
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financial structure variables holds across all nine specifications but the measure of overall 
financial development (FAG), the proxy for the financial services view, does not appear 
statistically significant in any of the specifications. These findings are in sharp contrast to the 
bulk of the existing literature, discussed above, which reports insignificance of the financial 
structure but significance of the overall financial development. Finance size (FZ) appears positive 
and significant in only one of the three specifications – Model (6).  Finance activity appears with 
negative and significant coefficients in two – Models (5) and (9) – of the three specifications. 
The negative effect of finance activity is rather unexpected and hard to explain.9 A clear message 
coming from the results of the high-income group is that financial structure matters for these 
countries. Structure measures contribute positively and significantly to their income levels in the 
long run. Given that FAG is insignificant across all three specifications, the financial services 
view, which emphasizes the overall financial development rather than its separation into bank- 
and market-based systems, is not supported.10  
The results from the panel of middle-and-low-income countries (Panel B) provide an 
entirely different picture, however. The overriding message is that financial structure virtually 
has no significance in middle-and-low-income countries (zero is inside the 95% credible 
interval).  Structure variables appear insignificant in all but one specification; the only exception 
is Model (6) where SA appears positive and significant. However, finance activity (FA: a 
combined measure of stock market trading and private sector lending by the intermediaries) 
appears positively signed and significant in all specifications. The overall message stemming 
from these results is that financial structure and finance size do not matter for the middle-and-
low-income countries;  what matters is the finance activity, measured by stock market trading 
and intermediaries’ lending to the private sector. Again, the measure of overall financial 
development (inclusive of size and activity), which proxies the financial services view in the 
literature, appears insignificant. 
Table 4 (Panel C) reports the results obtained from the full sample of countries. These 
results closely resemble those of the high-income group but are in sharp contrast to those of the 
middle-and-low-income group.  Basically, structure variables appear positive and statistically 
significant across all specifications but one – the only exception is Model (7). In contrast, finance 
aggregates appear insignificant in all specifications, resonating that financial structure is relevant 
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but the financial services view is not. Finance activity is insignificant in all specifications but 
finance size is insignificant in one count and negatively signed and significant in two counts. 
Thus, finance size does not appear conducive to long-run income levels when both high- and 
middle-and-low-income countries are pooled. On the role of financial structure, the results of the 
full sample appear similar to those of the high-income group echoing qualitatively the same 
message. 
The output elasticity of physical capital stock is quite different across the two groups of 
countries. The elasticity for the high-income group is close to unity, which ranges from 0.917 to 
1.026 across the nine models. In fact, the point elasticity for the high-income group is not 
different from unity as the value of unity (1.0) is inside the credible bounds. In contrast, the 
elasticity of physical capital stock for the panel of middle-and-low-income countries ranges from 
0.397 to 0.493. The magnitudes of the point estimates for the full sample range from 0.59 to 
0.631. Obviously, these point estimates are far from unity statistically.  
How sizable are these parameter estimates economically? Financial structure not only 
appears statistically significant in explaining income levels for the high-income group and the 
full sample, its growth effects also appear sizable. The coefficients of SA and SZ are semi-
elasticities as these covariates are measured as ratios. Therefore, the interpretation of their 
coefficients is that if SA or SZ changes by 0.01 (i.e., the ratio changes by 1%), then the 
percentage change in the real per capita income of high-income panel is 0.02% (the coefficient of 
SA ranges 0.018 to 0.020). The mean SA of high-income group is 0.53 (Table 1); approximately 
doubling of the SA – i.e., raising the sample mean of SA from 0.53 to 1.00 – increases the income 
level by about 1.0%. This is a sizable economic (growth) effect on sample countries, especially 
when their sample period’s average annual growth rate is just 1.7%. The average SA of the 25th 
percentile of high-income group is 0.105 and the 75th percentile is 0.739. The average annual 
growth rate of the 25th percentile is 0.32%. If the countries in the 25th percentile are able to push 
their financial system to be more market oriented by achieving the mean SA level of the 75th 
percentile then they appear to add in their average annual growth rate by 1.27% which, again, is 
a big growth effect.  
Likewise, the point elasticity of structure size is about 0.04, which exerts an even bigger 
economic effect than that of SA, suggesting that both size and activities of securities markets 
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relative to banks matter for the high-income group. The average SZ of the 25th and 75th 
percentiles are 0.379 and 1.250, respectively.  Applying the same approach as above, it is not 
difficult to see the big economic effects of SZ. Structure aggregate (SAG) is the first principal 
component of SA and SZ (the first principal component explains 70.1% of total variation; see 
notes to Table 4), which resumes parameters of approximately similar magnitude of SA (0.02) 
and similar magnitude of economic effect. The effect of SA for the full sample appears slightly 
bigger, whereas that of SZ is somewhat smaller compared to the high-income panel (but the 
results of the full sample should be taken with some caution as they seem to be driven by the 
results of the high-income group because financial structure measures appear insignificant for the 
middle-and-low-income countries which are in the majority in the full sample).  
For the middle-and-low-income countries, only the finance activity measure (i.e., the 
activities of intermediaries and markets together, exclusive of their size measures) shows 
positive and significant parameters across all specifications. The parameter of FA is 0.010 across 
specifications (Table 4). FA is measured in logarithms, therefore the parameters are point 
elasticities. By approximately doubling the FA – i.e., raising the sample mean of 0.52 to 1.00 – 
these countries could add to their growth rate by almost 0.92% (92 basis points). For example, 
Kenya grew by 0.4% per annum with a sample mean FA of 0.30. Had this country pursued 
policies that would have increased its finance activity to a sample mean of 0.52, it would have 
realized an average annual growth rate of 1.13% (an addition of 73 basis points). The mean FA of 
the 25th and 75th percentiles of middle-and-low countries are  0.223 and  0.661 which are much 
lower than their high-income counterparts of  0.822 and 2.038 (but note FA is not significant for 
the high-income panel). Along similar lines, FA shows potentials of large economic effects for 
the middle-and-low countries.  
Overall, our results suggest that financial structure is statistically significant in explaining 
long-run income levels for the group of high-income countries with sizable economic effects. 
Likewise, finance activities appear important for the group of middle-and-low-income countries 
– again with large economic effects. Our findings that a market oriented financial system is 
conducive to economic growth in high-income countries with a sizable economic effect 
implicitly corroborates the recent findings of Langfield and Pagano (2016) and reinforces their 
policy suggestions. They report the negative effects of oversized banks in Europe – that bank 
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bias in Europe has increased systemic risk and lowered economic growth – and make policy 
suggestions for rebalancing the financial structure in Europe by way of policy support for “the 
development of security markets as an alternative source of external funding (p. 91)”. Likewise, 
our findings of the significance of finance activity but the insignificance of financial structure in 
the middle-and-low income countries is consistent with the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2013) who find bank credit to be important for the countries in the lower income strata (25th 
percentile of their sample) but the effect of bank finance on growth gradually declines while the 
effect of capital markets gradually increases when economies grow richer and reach the 75th 
percentile of their sample (ordered by the level of per capita income).11 
The significance of financial structure is a new result. It is therefore important to pause 
and ask what is behind it. Is it the new dataset or the new econometric method? To answer this, 
we re-run the specifications and econometric methods employed by most of the existing 
literature with this new dataset. We then examine if they yield the widely reported insignificance 
of the financial structure. Following much of this literature (Beck et al., 2001; Levine, 2002; 
Beck and Levine, 2002), we specify the per capita real GDP growth rate (
, ,y i t
g ) as the dependent 
variable and the initial (1989) level of real income (
0,i
y ), per capita physical capital stock (
,i t
k ) 
and the measures of financial development ( ,i tfd ) and structure ( ,i tfs ), as the covariates, as 
shown in models M1 through M9 in Table 4.  
As our first re-run, we estimate the panel data models with country and time fixed effects, 
employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. All 
nine variants of our model are re-estimated. The results confirm our new findings: financial 
structure variables appear positive and significant across all specifications for the high-income 
panel. For the middle-and-low-income group and the full panel, both financial structure and 
finance aggregate (financial services view) appear statistically significant in most specifications. 
We also estimate the same fixed effects models using Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators, 
again with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Results are qualitatively similar to those 
from the OLS.12 Thus, in the panel framework, the significance of financial structure is upheld in 
the new dataset irrespective of the econometric approaches – our method or those employed in 
the previous literature. This suggests that the dataset may indeed have an important role in these 
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new results. However, the existing literature also estimates cross-sectional regressions utilizing 
the sample period or periodic mean values of both the regressand and the regressors and, at times, 
enters each measure of financial development and structure one-by-one rather than pairwise (e.g., 
Levine, 2002). We also estimate such specifications using sample averages data and estimators 
following the literature. Interestingly, in these cross-sectional estimates, both financial 
development and structure variables appear insignificant in almost all specifications with the new 
dataset. The dataset does not necessarily always produce the existing results when replicated. 
Hence we conclude that our new results are due to both the new dataset and our method. For 
brevity, we do not report the results of these re-runs but they are available upon request.   
4.1 Structural Break 
The results presented so far do not allow for potential structural breaks in the relationship. We 
have at most 23 years of data (when no lag and lead is required) for a typical model giving rise to, 
at most, 22 potential breaks with 23 regimes. Of course, these 23 regimes are theoretical 
possibilities; only empirical tests will reveal if there have been single or multiple regimes. We 
allow for all these break possibilities and identify the break dates by computing the posterior 
probability for the break indicator, Bt in equation (2). Simulation details are provided in the 
Online Appendix. Table 5 reports the results showing the most probable regimes and break 
locations. 
Table 5 near here 
The first column of Table 5 indicates nine different specifications for each panel; the second 
column reports the number of regimes along with the associated prior [.] and the computed 
posterior (.) probability. Since most data points resume very small probability, we report the two 
regimes with the highest posterior probabilities in the sample period. The final column in each 
panel reports the two break dates with the highest posterior probabilities across all 22 potential 
break dates for each of the models. Reported results are computed based on 100,000 iterations 
for each model. A considerably higher posterior probability than the prior signifies a break date 
and/or a regime change. For example, Model (2) for the high-income group shows two regimes 
with a probability of 76.9%, which is sizably larger than its prior of 32.9%. Further, the 
probability of a single regime is only 22.7% which is lower than the prior of 57.2%. Year 2008 
appears as the date of a break, with a probability of 65.6%, the highest posterior probability 
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across all 22 break dates. The other possible break date is 1990, which has the second highest 
probability of 12.1% across all simulations. Hence, there is one break in Model (2) and the year 
2008 seems to be the most probable break date which is the immediate aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis.  
Following the same line of inference, all in all, six of the nine models show one break 
(regime change). Five models involving – finance and structure aggregates (Model 1), finance 
aggregate and structure activity (Model 2), finance aggregate and structure size (Model 3), 
structure aggregate and finance activity (Model 5) and structure activity and finance activity 
(Model 7) – show one break / two regimes and the year 2008 as the break location. For these 
models, the probability of two regimes ranges from 42.3% to 92.5% and the year 2008 as the 
break date resumes probabilities in the range of 35.1% to 78.5%.  Model (9) also shows one 
break (two regimes) but the break date appears to be 1996. However, the posterior probability of 
having only one break takes a value of unity in this case, which we take with some caution. 
Models (4), (6) and (8) exhibit a very high probability of only one regime throughout the sample 
period and the probabilities associated with break dates are also low in comparison to the prior 
probabilities, signifying that there is no break in these relationships.  
In contrast, the results of the middle-and-low-income group do not show any break. For 
this group of countries, the posterior probabilities of only one regime are very high (99.9% or so) 
across all the models during the sample period. The posterior probabilities of two regimes appear 
virtually nil. The results for the full sample of countries (Panel C) are qualitatively similar to 
those of the middle-and-low-income group; there is no evidence of any break and/or regime 
change in the full panel of countries. The regime change found in the high-income group is not 
evident in the full sample of countries. This suggests that the group of high-income countries 
went through a regime shift in the relationship between financial development, structure and 
income level following the financial crisis of 2008. However, the panel of middle-and-low-
income has not gone through such a regime shift.     
Since only the high-income group of countries shows structural breaks, we estimate the 
cointegrating vector allowing for breaks for these countries alone. In order to allow for all 
potential break combinations, we estimate at least 221 models for each specification and the 
probability weighted mean of these parameters is computed. For brevity, we discuss the main 
23 
 
results and report the selected results in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. These estimates 
reveal that the elasticity of capital stock changes little across regimes in any of the nine models 
but the coefficients of financial development and financial structure seem to be affected by the 
breaks. Specifically, SAG is not significant in the first regime and only becomes significant in the 
second regime in Models (1), (4) and (5). Likewise, SA appears insignificant in the first regime 
but becomes briefly significant in the second regime and again turns insignificant during 2009-
2011 (e.g. Models 2 and 7). SZ and FZ seem to be less affected by regime changes overall (except 
SZ in Model 9), while the coefficient of FAG tends to become smaller after 2008 (e.g. Models 1 
and 3), but they remain insignificant throughout.  
The break date of 2008 identified above is determined endogenously (statistically). An 
alternative approach would be to split the sample period in 2008 and report the results for the 
period of 1989-2008 for all three panels (since Table 4 contains the results for the full sample for 
1989-2011). This is equivalent to imposing a break date in 2008 exogenously and estimating all 
models leading up to the crisis period of 2008, and beyond, separately. A comparison of these 
results provides insights if the relationship has changed post-2008 crisis. Table 6 reports these 
results. 
Table 6 near here 
The results show that for the high-income countries all financial structure variables are 
statistically significant in explaining income levels, whereas finance activity, finance size and 
finance aggregate are insignificant. These results uphold our earlier findings that financial 
structure is important for the high-income group. Put differently, the results of the full sample 
period, which showed the significance of structure variables, are robust in the sample period 
leading only up to the crisis period. Two differences are (i) finance size which is insignificant for 
the period leading up to the crisis (1989-2008) turns positive and significant in the full sample 
(1989-2011) in one of the three specifications, and (ii) finance activity, which is insignificant 
leading up to the crisis period, turns negative and significant post-2008 in two specifications. 
This implies that the relationship between finance size and income levels appears to have 
improved whereas between the finance activity and the income level it appears to have 
deteriorated following the financial crisis for high-income groups. The significance of FZ post-
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2008 may reflect that the size matters – i.e., “too big to fail” – phenomenon which was also 
evident in various bailouts. The negative effect of FA, as admitted above, is hard to explain. 
For the panel of middle-and-low-income countries, the importance of the finance activity 
variable, as found above in the full sample period, remains robust. One noticeable difference is 
that the finance aggregate variable appears significant in two of the three specifications during 
1989-2008 but all appear insignificant in the full sample period. This suggests that the financial 
crisis of 2008 has weakened the relationship between finance aggregate and income levels – 
financial services view – across the sample of medium-and-low-income countries. When high-
income and middle-and-low-income countries are pooled, the results appear qualitatively similar 
between pre- and post-crisis periods.              
5. Robustness 
We perform a range of sensitivity checks on our reported results. First, we examine if the 
results are sensitive to the exclusion of some of the major countries in the panel. We dropped 
major countries – the US, Germany, the UK and Japan – one at a time from the high-income 
panel and re-estimated all the models. Our main findings – (i) financial structure is important in 
explaining income levels of this group of countries, and (ii) financial services view is 
insignificant – remain robust.   
As stated above, Bangladesh and Kenya are classed as low-income countries. We, 
therefore, dropped these two countries from the panel of middle-and-low-income countries and 
re-estimated all models in the panel of 34 middle-income countries only. Dropping these two 
countries does not change any of the reported results for the panel of 36 counties qualitatively. 
We also checked if our results of middle-and-low-income countries are sensitive to any one 
major country in the panel. We re-estimated all the models by dropping Brazil, China, India and 
Mexico, one at a time, from the panel, yet the reported results for this group of countries remain 
robust. We also sequentially dropped these major countries from the full panel of 69 countries; 
results across all specifications remain qualitatively the same. Our results, obtained from the 
sample leading up to the crisis period (1989-2008), also remain robust to these sensitivity checks. 
6. Conclusion 
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It is widely believed that the effectiveness of the financial system and its contribution to 
economic development and growth is not independent of its institutional structure (i.e., the 
financial structure). However, the weight of evidence accumulated in the last two decades or so 
suggests otherwise – i.e., financial structure is irrelevant for growth. Lately, there have been 
advances both on data and econometric fronts. We re-examine this issue – the relevance or 
otherwise of financial structure on economic growth – following the standard literature but 
employing a new dataset and a new empirical methodology.  
We employ a novel dataset of CDFL (2013). This dataset ensures ‘higher quality’ and 
‘consistency over time’.  Indeed, a comparison of this dataset with the previously analyzed data 
shows important differences in the measures of relevant variables. We analyze a sample of 69 
countries – 33 high-income and 36 middle-and-low-income countries – with the longest and 
complete data series (1989-2011) reported in the database.  Our sample has a balanced panel of 
1587 observations (country years) for the full sample; 759 observations for the high-income 
group and 828 observations for the panel of middle-and-low-income group. We separately model 
the panels of (i) high-income, (ii) middle-and-low-income, and (iii) the full sample of countries. 
Methodologically, we have extended the Dynamic OLS estimator of cointegrating vectors to the 
Bayesian framework which allows for multiple breaks (shifts) in the cointegrating parameters. 
We follow a very general approach in modeling regime shifts (breaks) such that a regime shift 
could occur in any or every data point in the sample. We estimate nine different specifications to 
cater for different measures and combinations of financial structure and growth.  
Our results are quite unique and interesting. We find that real income levels, financial 
development and structure share an equilibrating (cointegrating) relationship in the long run 
across all specifications and panels. All measures of financial structure appear significant for 
high-income countries with sizable economic effects. Interestingly, our results are not supportive 
of the financial services view, as known in the literature. Thus, our findings are in sharp contrast 
to the weight of evidence accumulated in the last two decades or so which reports the 
insignificance of the financial structure but the significance of the financial services view.  
We also find that results are not uniform across the high-income and the middle-and-low-
income group of countries. For the latter group, neither the financial structure nor the overall 
financial development (the usual proxy of financial services view in the literature) appears 
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significant; instead, just finance activity (a joint measure of stock market trading and private 
sector lending by the intermediaries exclusive of their size) appears positive and significant in 
explaining their income levels with sizable economic effects.  
We find one structural break (regime shift) in the year 2008 which we attribute to the 
financial crisis of 2008. Again, this regime shift is only evident in the panel of high-income 
countries; there is no evidence of any break in the panel of middle-and-low-income countries. 
This is not surprising, given that the financial crisis of 2008 is mainly confined to the high-
income countries. Robustness checks confirm that our results are not susceptible to any large or 
small countries in the sample – results remain robust to the sequential exclusion of a large 
number of countries from the sample. Our findings, based on a novel dataset and a new empirical 
method, are consistent with the widely held belief that financial structure matters for growth – 
we find evidence of this for the panel of high-income countries. Hence, our results may be 
viewed as an important counterexample to the weight of evidence that reports financial structure 
to be irrelevant.  
Our findings that a more market-based financial system relative to a bank-based one 
contributes to economic growth in industrialized (high-income) countries imply that policy 
makers in these countries should follow financial sector policies that help further develop 
financial markets. In fact, our policy prescription is very similar to those of Langfield and 
Pagano (2016) who also prescribe re-balancing the financial structure of European countries by 
downsizing big banks and further developing the securities markets, i.e., making the European 
financial system more market-based. Their policy prescription originates from their findings that 
the European financial structure has become “bank-biased” which has increased systemic risk 
and impacted adversely on economic growth, whereas our policy prescription is based on the 
results obtained from our direct tests of the relevance or otherwise of financial structure on real 
income levels. Likewise, our findings of the relevance of finance activity but the irrelevance of 
financial structure for middle-and-low income countries – which, as discussed above, is 
consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) – imply that authorities in these countries should 
focus both on the development of sound banking and securities markets through prudent 
financial laws and regulations but they should also be mindful that as economies grow and 
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become richer then a gradual re-balancing between intermediaries and security markets may be 
required. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics   
 Panel A: High-income Countries 
 Sample mean (1989-2011) Average annual growth (1989-2011) 
 Y FA FZ SA SZ Y FA FZ SA SZ 
Australia 29,117 1.43 1.73 0.61 1.02 1.8 6.0 4.0 4.1 -1.2 
Austria 31,784 1.11 1.21 0.09 0.19 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 0.5 
Barbados 21,454 0.61 1.40 0.07 1.36 0.5 3.3 6.0 -3.8 5.8 
Belgium 30,038 0.90 1.28 0.23 0.79 1.4 5.1 3.1 2.3 -3.5 
Canada 32,230 1.76 2.09 0.45 0.74 1.2 3.6 2.9 6.2 2.1 
Cyprus 16,453 2.04 2.28 0.06 0.18 1.7 4.1 3.7 -0.7 -3.4 
Denmark 30,879 1.43 1.59 0.40 0.69 1.3 7.3 6.0 0.6 -3.6 
Finland 27,807 1.44 1.54 1.09 1.33 1.6 2.7 1.6 9.3 2.2 
France 28,081 1.42 1.53 0.54 0.67 1.2 2.8 2.1 7.4 2.3 
Germany 30,784 1.49 1.43 0.41 0.35 1.5 1.4 1.3 2.8 2.5 
Greece 21,629 0.79 0.96 0.46 0.80 1.0 6.4 5.8 8.8 -1.0 
Hong Kong 32,237 3.68 4.50 1.48 2.09 3.0 7.1 3.9 11.6 4.6 
Hungary 14,484 0.53 0.57 0.34 0.47 1.2 2.8 2.7 19.9 10.1 
Iceland 31,000 1.38 1.53 0.21 0.41 1.5 4.4 4.0 3.6 -1.9 
Israel 22,012 1.03 1.30 0.38 0.72 2.8 4.0 4.2 7.0 5.3 
Italy 27,641 1.07 1.06 0.40 0.42 0.8 4.8 3.3 6.0 -3.6 
Japan 28,959 2.52 2.70 0.33 0.42 0.9 -0.2 -1.1 -0.6 -3.0 
Kuwait 38,571 0.97 1.27 0.82 1.46 2.0 -0.9 -0.2 5.4 3.5 
Luxembourg 58,001 1.22 2.72 0.02 1.32 2.4 2.4 -0.6 -10.5 -4.9 
Netherlands 34,048 2.23 2.18 0.69 0.73 1.8 4.5 3.4 0.4 -2.7 
New Zealand 22,542 1.19 1.45 0.13 0.40 1.3 3.5 3.1 1.6 -0.7 
Norway 42,039 1.16 1.19 0.44 0.49 1.8 1.9 1.5 7.4 3.9 
Oman 20,854 0.38 0.55 0.17 0.70 1.1 2.5 3.3 5.4 3.2 
Portugal 20,280 1.28 1.40 0.15 0.28 1.5 6.5 5.9 2.0 -2.6 
Republic of 
Korea 
19,921 1.76 1.31 1.19 0.68 4.8 5.1 3.1 4.1 0.4 
Saudi Arabia 20,596 1.19 1.12 1.25 1.08 1.7 1.3 0.2 16.0 3.5 
Singapore 38,682 1.89 2.56 0.90 1.57 3.9 2.8 1.3 5.4 0.9 
Spain 24,603 1.99 1.74 0.71 0.53 1.6 6.1 4.8 7.0 0.2 
Sweden 30,252 1.85 1.92 0.81 0.88 1.6 3.5 2.0 9.9 1.8 
Switzerland 37,452 3.14 3.36 1.00 1.15 0.8 2.7 2.0 7.1 3.3 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
16,069 0.39 0.85 0.05 1.40 3.5 -1.4 2.6 2.1 11.3 
United Kingdom 30,212 2.45 2.60 0.73 0.95 1.5 3.4 2.4 1.2 -1.4 
United States of 
America 
39,385 3.26 2.69 0.96 0.68 1.4 4.5 2.5 6.1 0.7 
Mean 28,791 1.54 1.74 0.53 0.82 1.7 3.7 2.5 5.6 1.0 
 
Panel B: Middle-and-low-income countries 
 Sample mean (1989-2011) Average annual growth (1989-2011) 
 Y FA FZ SA SZ Y FA FZ SA SZ 
Argentina 12,730 0.19 0.41 0.21 1.62 3.0 0.1 2.5 -0.4 9.7 
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Bangladesh 1,010 0.29 0.30 0.09 0.18 3.6 6.4 6.0 28.8 4.7 
Botswana 10,174 0.16 0.34 0.05 1.14 2.7 6.1 6.2 -0.6 0.2 
Brazil 8,196 0.54 0.70 0.40 0.86 1.4 3.8 4.4 13.2 11.6 
Chile 10,997 0.81 1.59 0.19 1.36 3.7 4.0 5.0 6.2 3.6 
China 3,244 1.44 1.33 0.45 0.34 9.2 5.4 4.2 17.2 13.1 
Colombia 7,018 0.31 0.50 0.07 0.71 1.9 3.7 6.7 15.9 12.3 
Côte d'Ivoire 1,904 0.20 0.34 0.02 0.86 -1.0 -2.7 0.8 13.1 11.6 
Ecuador 6,776 0.24 0.30 0.02 0.26 1.3 3.3 3.5 -5.9 0.9 
Egypt 4,254 0.53 0.74 0.25 0.70 2.8 1.7 2.5 21.1 8.8 
Ghana 1,140 0.09 0.21 0.07 1.46 2.8 4.9 6.7 -8.4 3.7 
India 1,904 0.70 0.73 1.22 1.31 4.8 5.1 5.7 8.3 7.6 
Indonesia 2,906 0.43 0.55 0.37 0.83 3.4 2.0 4.2 20.6 17.9 
Iran 8,067 0.32 0.41 0.07 0.38 3.3 2.0 2.7 8.6 6.4 
Jamaica 6,651 0.24 0.72 0.12 2.49 0.5 -0.7 1.8 1.6 5.1 
Jordan 3,955 1.08 1.72 0.48 1.36 2.0 0.5 1.7 4.1 4.0 
Kenya 1,356 0.30 0.50 0.05 0.76 0.4 1.0 3.2 14.7 8.1 
Malaysia 10,560 1.71 2.60 0.57 1.42 3.7 1.8 1.9 4.4 1.7 
Mauritius 8,964 0.57 0.90 0.03 0.60 3.7 5.1 6.4 9.6 4.1 
Mexico 11,297 0.29 0.47 0.40 1.30 1.2 3.9 5.3 2.7 4.0 
Morocco 3,249 0.54 0.81 0.12 0.64 2.6 8.4 10.4 13.4 8.1 
Namibia 4,910 0.43 0.49 0.01 0.16 1.8 3.4 4.2 -9.4 7.8 
Nigeria 1,476 0.16 0.27 0.08 0.84 2.9 4.1 4.8 19.0 3.2 
Pakistan 1,946 0.52 0.41 1.16 0.75 1.7 -0.2 0.7 13.6 6.3 
Panama 8,283 0.70 0.90 0.01 0.26 3.9 2.7 3.8 6.8 6.3 
Paraguay 4,754 0.23 0.25 0.01 0.10 0.9 4.6 4.8 -9.5 2.1 
Peru 5,595 0.21 0.46 0.18 1.47 2.8 7.9 12.0 5.1 9.2 
Philippines 2,832 0.44 0.79 0.32 1.45 1.7 3.2 4.9 3.7 4.2 
South Africa 8,147 1.69 2.78 0.41 1.41 0.7 5.3 2.4 10.8 -1.5 
Sri Lanka 3,099 0.26 0.39 0.11 0.81 4.4 2.6 4.1 18.3 6.7 
Swaziland 4,248 0.17 0.26 0.00 0.59 1.5 1.8 2.5 -17.7 3.9 
Thailand 5,957 1.50 1.63 0.38 0.50 3.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 2.4 
Tunisia 6,275 0.62 0.73 0.02 0.19 3.1 1.6 2.2 11.3 4.7 
Turkey 10,108 0.45 0.39 1.34 1.01 2.7 8.8 6.8 19.4 5.7 
Uruguay 9,471 0.29 0.30 0.00 0.03 2.8 -1.1 -1.2 -9.6 -3.8 
Venezuela 8,379 0.18 0.24 0.09 0.52 0.9 -3.2 -3.3 -9.8 -2.3 
Mean 5,754 0.52 0.73 0.26 0.85 2.5 3.3 3.7 7.9 4.9 
           
Full sample 
mean 
16,840 1.01 1.22 0.39 0.84 1.9 3.6 2.9 6.2 2.9 
Note: Y denotes real per capita income. Finance-activity (FA) = (private credit + total value traded)/GDP; 
Finance-size (FZ) = (private credit + market capitalization)/GDP. Although FA and FZ are defined as the 
log of the product of two respective ratios in the text, in this Table we report the mean of the ratios, as 
defined here, for the ease of inference and interpretation. These measures directly give the size 
(proportion) of the financial sector and its activity relative to the country’s economy (GDP). In any case, 
these ratio measures are equivalent to the anti-log (exponential) of the mean log values as defined in the 
text and elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Levine, 2002). Structure-activity (SA) = stock market value 
traded/private credit; Structure-size (SZ) = stock market capitalization/private credit.  
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Table 2: Measures of financial development and structure based on previous and new (current) 
datasets  
 SA SZ FA 
 previous new previous new previous new 
Australia 0.31 0.61 0.09 1.02 0.12 1.43 
Canada 0.32 0.45 0.94 0.74 0.12 1.76 
Denmark 0.15 0.40 0.54 0.69 0.03 1.43 
France 0.10 0.54 0.24 0.67 0.08 1.42 
Germany 0.22 0.40 0.22 0.35 0.17 1.49 
Japan 0.37 0.33 0.70 0.42 0.65 2.52 
Sweden 0.31 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.15 1.85 
Switzerland 0.68 1.00 0.49 1.15 1.73 3.14 
UK 0.48 0.73 1.02 0.95 0.26 2.45 
USA 0.53 0.96 0.99 0.68 0.45 3.26 
Brazil 0.40 0.40 0.73 0.86 0.02 0.54 
Chile 0.09 0.19 0.97 1.36 0.02 0.81 
Colombia 0.05 0.07 0.46 0.71 0.00# 0.31 
India 0.22 1.22 0.55 1.31 0.01 0.70 
Malaysia 0.73 0.57 1.82 1.42 0.34 1.71 
Mexico 0.44 0.40 0.98 1.30 0.01 0.29 
Pakistan 0.08 1.16 0.38 0.75 0.00# 0.52 
Philippines 0.23 0.32 0.98 1.45 0.02 0.44 
Thailand 0.42 0.38 0.52 0.50 0.14 1.50 
Turkey 0.48 1.34 0.48 1.01 0.00# 0.45 
Note: Data used by Levine (2002) are treated as the previous dataset which covers 48 countries over the 
1980-1995 period. Numbers reported in the ‘previous’ columns are directly obtained from Tables I and II 
of Levine (op. cit.) and their anti-logs are reported. Numbers reported in the ‘new’ columns are based on 
the dataset used in this study: different measures are the authors’ own calculations (Table 1).  
# For these countries FA resumes a positive value only in the third decimal place. 
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Table 3: Results of Panel Cointegration Tests 
 Panel A: High-income Panel B: Middle-and-low-
income 
Panel C: Full Sample 
Group ADF-
Statistics 
P-value Group ADF-
Statistics 
P-value Group ADF-
Statistics 
P-value 
M1 -3.391 3e-4 -6.525 0.000 -7.059 0.000 
M2 -3.475 3e-4 -7.856 0.000 -8.078 0.000 
M3 -4.264 0.000 -5.585 0.000 -6.983 0.000 
M4 -3.924 0.000 -5.941 0.000 -7.005 0.000 
M5 -2.548 0.005 -6.634 0.000 -6.554 0.000 
M6 -3.777 1e-4 -5.440 0.000 -6.541 0.000 
M7 -2.231 0.0128 -7.917 0.000 -7.261 0.000 
M8 -5.099 0.000 -5.330 0.000 -7.376 0.000 
M9 -3.677 1e-4 -6.088 0.000 -6.940 0.000 
 
Note: H0: no cointegration. Reported results are Group-ADF tests. The lag length is chosen by the 
Schwarz information criterion with the maximum length set to 3. The test was carried out including an 
intercept and trend. The generic cointegrating regression for the test is:
. 1, 2, 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
.
i t i i i t i t i t i t
y t k fd fs             
Models M1 through M9 are obtained by replacing the pairs of ,i tfd and ,i tfs  as: (i) F
AG and SAG, (ii) FAG 
and SA, (iii) FAG and SZ, (iv) SAG and SZ, (v) SA and FZ, (vi) SA and FZ, (vii) SA and FA, (viii) SZ and FZ, 
and (ix) SZ and FA.  These models are denoted by Model (1) through Model (9) in the text. The findings of 
cointegration are largely robust to other test statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999), such as the Panel ADF, 
Panel PP and Group PP.   
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Table 4: Estimation results with no structural breaks in 1989-2011.  
Model  k F
AG SAG SA SZ FZ FA 
 Panel A: High-Income Panel 
M1 0.94* 
(0.704,1.175) 
0.0078 
(-0.005,0.02) 
0.0196* 
(0.006,0.033) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
M2 0.943* 
(0.703,1.183) 
0.0093 
(-0.003,0.022) 
─ 0.0187* 
(0.003,0.034) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.921* 
(0.693,1.148) 
0.008 
(-0.003,0.019) 
─ ─ 0.0357* 
(0.016,0.055) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.929* 
(0.695,1.162) 
─ 0.0174* 
(0.004,0.031) 
─ ─ 0.0228 
(-2e-4,0.046) 
─ 
M5 1.026* 
(0.841,1.211) 
─ 0.0209* 
(0.009,0.033) 
─ ─ ─ -0.0129* 
(-0.023,-2e-3) 
M6 0.932* 
(0.701,1.164) 
─ ─ 0.0176* 
(0.003,0.032) 
─ 0.0266* 
(0.006,0.047) 
─ 
M7 0.956* 
(0.727,1.186) 
─ ─ 0.0202* 
(0.005,0.035) 
─ ─ 0.0079 
(-0.005,0.021) 
M8 0.917* 
(0.687,1.147) 
─ ─ ─ 0.0324* 
(0.01,0.055) 
0.0198 
(-0.003,0.042) 
─ 
M9 0.982* 
(0.791,1.174) 
─ ─ ─ 0.0377* 
(0.013,0.062) 
─ -0.0115* 
(-0.023,-4e-4) 
Panel B: Middle-and-Low-Income Panel 
M1 0.443* 
(0.404,0.481) 
0.003 
(-8e-4,0.007) 
-0.005 
(-0.014,0.003) 
─ ─  ─ 
M2 0.466* 
(0.424,0.509) 
0.002 
(-0.004,0.008) 
─ 0.004 
(-0.01,0.018) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.433* 
(0.407,0.458) 
0.003 
(-6e-4,0.007) 
─ ─ -0.006 
(-0.015,0.003) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.438* 
(0.386,0.491) 
─ -0.005 
(-0.017,0.007) 
─ ─ 0.0038 
(-0.002,0.009) 
─ 
M5 0.412* 
(0.347,0.476) 
─ -0.006 
(-0.015,0.003) 
─ ─ ─ 0.010* 
(0.008,0.013) 
M6 0.493* 
(0.44,0.547) 
─ ─ 0.018* 
(0.009,0.028) 
─ 0.004 
(-4e-4,0.008) 
─ 
M7 0.431* 
(0.375,0.488) 
─ ─ -0.008 
(-0.017,0.003) 
─ ─ 0.009* 
(0.007,0.011) 
M8 0.419* 
(0.356,0.483) 
─ ─ ─ -0.007 
(-0.021,0.005) 
0.005 
(-8e-4,0.011) 
─ 
M9 0.397* 
(0.339,0.456) 
─ ─ ─ -0.006 
(-0.015,0.003) 
─ 0.010* 
(0.008,0.012) 
Panel C: Full Sample 
M1 0.626* 
(0.529,0.722) 
-0.005 
(-0.011,0.001) 
0.010* 
(0.004,0.016) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
M2 0.628* 
(0.54,0.717) 
-0.004 
(-0.01,0.002) 
─ 0.0104* 
(0.002,0.019) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.605* 
(0.52,0.69) 
-0.005 
(-0.01,0.001) 
─ ─ 0.014* 
(0.007,0.021) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.631* 
(0.522,0.739) 
─ 0.012* 
(0.004,0.02) 
─ ─ -0.014* 
(-0.026,-0.001) 
─ 
M5 0.608* 
(0.51,0.707) 
─ 0.009* 
(0.003,0.016) 
─ ─ ─ -0.003 
(-0.008,0.002) 
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M6 0.619* 
(0.533,0.705) 
─ ─ 0.0096* 
(0.001,0.018) 
─ -0.008 
(-0.016,2e-4) 
─ 
M7 0.621* 
(0.514,0.728) 
─ ─ 0.009 
(-1e-4,0.019) 
─ ─ -0.003 
(-0.008,0.002) 
M8 0.618* 
(0.523,0.712) 
─ ─ ─ 0.018* 
(0.008,0.028) 
-0.014* 
(-0.027,-6e-4) 
─ 
M9 0.590* 
(0.501,0.678) 
─ ─ ─ 0.013* 
(0.005,0.021) 
─ -0.003 
(-0.008,0.003) 
Estimation results for the full sample period (1989-2011) with no structural breaks. The numbers within 
parentheses indicate the 95% posterior credible intervals. The variables are: k = per capita physical capital 
stock; FAG = finance aggregate (the first principal component of FA and FZ); SAG = structure aggregate (the 
first principal component of SA and SZ). The first principal components of FA and FZ and SA and SZ 
respectively explain 94.3% and 70.1% of their pairwise total variations. SA = structure activity (stock 
market total value traded to private credit ratio); SZ = structure size (stock market capitalization to private 
credit ratio); FA = finance activity (Ln(private credit ratio × stock market value traded ratio)); FZ = finance 
size (Ln(private credit ratio × stock market capitalization ratio)). The generic model is: 
 
1 1 1
1
2
. 1, 2, 3, 4, , , 5, , , 6, , ,
1 1
2
1 , 2 , 3 , ,
; . . .N(0, )
d d d
i t i i i i j i t j i j i t j i j i t j
j d j d j d
i t i t i t it i t
y t t k fd fs
k fd fs i i d
     
     
  
  
        
   
  
 
The nine different models (M1 through M9) are specified as outlined in the notes for Table 3. * denotes 
parameter significance at 5%, i.e., zero is outside of the 5% credible bounds. 
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Table 5: The number of regimes and the location of break points for full, high-income and 
middle-and-low-income countries. 
Models Panel A:  
High-Income Panel 
Panel B:  
Middle-and-Low-Income Panel 
Panel C: 
 Full Sample 
number of regimes location of breaks number of regimes location  number of regimes location of breaks 
M1        1       ,       2♣ 
 (0.5051)   (0.4928) 
[0.5724]    [0.3288] 
   2008♣     ,     1990 
 (0.3501)    (0.1465) 
[0.0335]    [0.0178] 
       1      ,        2 
(0.9996)   (4e-4) 
[0.5752]  [0.3281] 
   2003 
(4e-4)  
[0.0287] 
       1       ,        2 
(0.9656)   (0.0344) 
[0.5737]   [0.3284] 
   2003      ,    2008 
(0.0316)    (0.0028) 
[0.0267]    [0.0346] 
M2        2♣        ,      1 
(0.7692)    (0.2268) 
[0.3288]   [0.5724] 
   2008♣    ,      1990 
(0.6556)      (0.1213) 
[0.0335]      [0.0178] 
       1        ,       2 
      (1)            (0) 
[0.5752]    [0.3281] 
        1       ,          2 
(0.9069)     (0.0931) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2003      ,    2008 
(0.0926)      (4e-4) 
[0.0267]    [0.0346] 
M3        1        ,       2♣ 
(0.5753)    (0.4232) 
[0.5724]   [0.3288] 
   2008♣     ,     1990 
(0.4055)     (0.0191) 
[0.0335]     [0.0178] 
       1        ,        2 
(0.9985)    (0.0015) 
[0.5752]    [0.3281] 
   2003 
(0.0015) 
[0.0287] 
       1       ,          2 
(0.9593)     (0.0407) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2003      ,    2008 
(0.0353)     (0.0054) 
[0.0267]     [0.0346] 
M4        1        ,      2 
(0.8736)    (0.1263) 
[0.5724]    [0.3288] 
   2008     ,     1990 
(0.0986)      (0.0275) 
[0.0335]      [0.0178] 
       1        ,        2 
    (1)               (0) 
[0.5752]    [0.3281] 
        1        ,          2 
(0.9985)     (0.0015) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2008      ,     1997 
(0.0013)      (1e-4) 
[0.0346]     [0.0218] 
M5        2♣        ,      1 
(0.7676)    (0.2291) 
[0.3288]    [0.5724] 
   2008♣    ,   1990 
(0.444)       (0.329) 
[0.0335]     [0.0178] 
       1          ,       2 
      (1)               (0) 
[0.5752]     [0.3281] 
        1        ,          2 
(0.9957)     (0.0043) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
2008      ,     2003 
(0.0032)    (0.0011) 
[0.0346]    [0.0267] 
M6        1        ,      2 
(0.7577)    (0.2422) 
[0.5724]    [0.3288] 
   2008     ,      1990 
(0.2316)      (0.0107) 
[0.0335]      [0.0178] 
       1          ,       2 
(0.9999)   (0.0001) 
[0.5752]   [0.3281] 
   1999 
(1e-04)  
[0.0245] 
       1        ,          2 
(0.9968)    (0.0032) 
[0.5737]    [0.3284] 
   2003      ,     2008 
(0.002)        (0.0012) 
[0.0267]     [0.0346] 
M7        2♣        ,      1 
(0.9248)    (0.0676) 
[0.3288]    [0.5724] 
    2008♣    ,       1990 
(0.7854)       (0.1534) 
[0.0335]       [0.0178] 
       1          ,       2 
      (1)               (0) 
[0.5752]     [0.3281] 
        1        ,          2 
(0.9988)     (0.0012) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2008      ,     2003 
(7e-4)           (5e-4) 
[0.0346]     [0.0267] 
M8        1        ,      2 
 (0.8012)   (0.1986)  
[0.5724]    [0.3288] 
   2008     ,       1990 
(0.1839)       (0.0136) 
[0.0335]       [0.0178] 
       1          ,       2 
(0.9999)     (0.0001) 
[0.5752]     [0.3281] 
   2000 
(1e-04)  
[0.0254] 
       1         ,          2 
(0.9832)     (0.0168) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2008 
(0.0168) 
[0.0346] 
M9        2♣        ,      3 
(0.9749)    (0.0251) 
[0.3284]    [0.0835] 
1996♣ , 2005,   2004 
   (1)    (0.024)  (0.001) 
[0.021] [0.029] [0.028] 
       1         ,       2 
      (1)               (0) 
[0.5752]     [0.3281] 
        1        ,          2 
(0.9915)     (0.0085) 
[0.5737]     [0.3284] 
   2008      ,     2003 
(0.0066)     (0.0019) 
[0.0346]    [0.0267] 
Note: The numbers inside () are the posterior probabilities and the numbers inside [] are the prior 
probabilities. Models are defined in the notes to Tables 3 and 5. ♣ signifies one regime shift 
(break) and the most probable break date. 
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Table 6: Estimation results with no structural breaks (1989-2008).  
 k FAG SAG SA SZ FZ FA 
Panel A: High-Income Panel 
M1 0.844* 
(0.547, 1.14) 
0.003 
(-0.008, 0.015) 
0.023* 
(0.005, 0.041) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
M2 0.865* 
(0.556, 1.174) 
0.006 
(-0.006, 0.017) 
─ 0.023* 
(0.002, 0.045) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.827* 
(0.53, 1.122) 
0.004 
(-0.007, 0.015) 
─ ─ 0.036* 
(0.013, 0.06) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.841* 
(0.536, 1.146) 
─ 0.022* 
(0.002, 0.042) 
─ ─ 0.010 
(-0.015, 0.035) 
─ 
M5 0.847* 
(0.557, 1.138) 
─ 0.023* 
(0.006, 0.040) 
─ ─ ─ 0.004 
(-7e-3,0.015) 
M6 0.858* 
(0.541, 1.175) 
─ ─ 0.022* 
(0.001, 0.043) 
─ 0.018 
(-0.003, 0.038) 
─ 
M7 0.871* 
(0.57, 1.171) 
─ ─ 0.0231* 
(0.003, 0.043) 
─ ─ 0.006 
(-4e-3,0.017) 
M8 0.826* 
(0.526, 1.126) 
─ ─ ─ 0.036* 
(0.007, 0.065) 
0.006 
(-0.021, 0.032) 
─ 
M9 0.832* 
(0.541, 1.123) 
─ ─ ─ 0.036* 
(0.013, 0.059) 
─ 0.005 
(-5e-3,0.015) 
Panel B: Middle-and-Low-Income Panel 
M1 0.514* 
(0.415, 0.613) 
0.005* 
(0.001,0.008) 
0.004 
(-0.005,0.013) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
M2 0.548* 
(0.437, 0.659) 
0.0047 
(-0.001,0.01) 
─ 0.006 
(-0.009,0.02) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.482* 
(0.398, 0.567) 
0.006* 
(0.002,0.009) 
─ ─ 0.004 
(-0.005,0.013) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.504* 
(0.344,0.665) 
─ 0.004 
(-0.006,0.013) 
─ ─ 0.001 
(-0.006,0.007) 
─ 
M5 0.490* 
(0.406,0.574) 
─ 0.003 
(-0.002,0.007) 
─ ─ ─ 0.010* 
(6e-3,0.014) 
M6 0.532* 
(0.416,0.649) 
─ ─ 0.015* 
(0.004,0.027) 
─ 0.007 
(-0.002,0.015) 
─ 
M7 0.531* 
(0.437,0.624) 
─ ─ -0.0005 
(-0.011,0.01) 
─ ─ 0.009* 
(5e-3,0.013)  
M8 0.497* 
(0.35,0.644) 
─ ─ ─ 0.004 
(-0.006,0.014) 
0.001 
(-0.005,0.006) 
─ 
M9 0.473* 
(0.391,0.555) 
─ ─ ─ 0.002 
(-0.002,0.006) 
─ 0.011* 
(7e-3,0.015) 
Panel C: Full Sample 
M1 0.617* 
(0.388, 0.847) 
-0.0029 
(-0.01, 0.004) 
0.020* 
(0.01,0.031) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
M2 0.709* 
(0.438, 0.981) 
-0.0053 
(-0.013, 0.002) 
─ 0.047* 
(0.018, 0.075) 
─ ─ ─ 
M3 0.702* 
(0.626, 0.778) 
-0.0059 
(-0.014, 0.002) 
─ ─ 0.016* 
(0.008, 0.024) 
─ ─ 
M4 0.601* 
(0.372, 0.829) 
─ 0.018* 
(0.006, 0.03) 
─ ─ -0.012 
(-0.03, 0.002) 
─ 
M5 0.605* 
(0.404, 0.807) 
─ 0.017* 
(0.01, 0.025) 
─ ─ ─ 0.002 
(-5e-3, 8e-3) 
M6 0.641* 
(0.416, 0.865) 
─ ─ 0.033* 
(0.009, 0.057) 
─ -0.005 
(-0.018, 0.009) 
─ 
38 
 
M7 0.709* 
(0.461, 0.958) 
─ ─ 0.046* 
(0.018, 0.075) 
─ ─ -4e-3 
(-0.01,4e-3) 
M8 0.735* 
(0.644, 0.825) 
─ ─ ─ 0.021* 
(0.008, 0.034) 
-0.020* 
(-0.037, -0.004) 
─ 
M9 0.678* 
(0.57, 0.787) 
─ ─ ─ 0.014* 
(0.007, 0.021) 
─ -0.003 
(-0.01, 4e-3) 
Note: The numbers within () indicate the 95% posterior credible intervals. Variable definition 
and specifications are described in the notes to Table 5. * denotes parameter significance at 5%, 
i.e., zero is outside of the 5% credible bounds. 
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1 The theoretical debate surrounding the bank-based, market-based, financial services and the law-and-
finance views are well documented elsewhere, hence we do not detail the arguments for and against them. 
A succinct summary of these could be found in, among others, Beck et al. (2001), Beck and Levine 
(2002), Levine (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) and Luintel et al. (2008).  
 
2 The law-and-finance view is associated with and well elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998), Gorton and 
Schmid, (2000), La Porta et al. (2008); Djankov et al. (2007); Djankov et al. (2008), among others.  
 
3 This dataset is available at http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 
 
4 For example, if there is one break then there will be T-1 possible break locations, where T is the sample 
period; if there are two breaks then there will be 
( 1)( 2)
2
T T 
 possible combinations of the break 
locations. The number of breaks can range from 0 to T-1. Hence the total number of possibilities is 2T-1. 
 
5 In a panel with short time dimension and/or cross-sectional setups it is commonplace to employ several 
other determinants of growth, namely, the years of schooling (human capital), black market premiums, 
indicators of civil liberty, revolutions and coups, assassinations, bureaucratic efficiency, corruptions etc. 
as in Levine (2002) and Beck and Levine (2004). However, data on these variables are collected through 
periodic surveys and are not sufficiently long to include in panel studies such as this one which has a time 
series dimension of 23 years for each variable.  
 
6 This gives rise to 15 possible specifications. Due to the large amount of parameters in the DOLS model, 
we cannot set the maximum number of lags and leads to be bigger than our choice of the one given 
T0=15. Our data span is from 1989 to 2011. The actual number of periods (T) in the estimation depends 
on the number of lags and leads. If both the number of lags and leads is 1, then the choice T0=15 implies 
that we evaluate models on the basis of predictions for the years from 2006-2010. 
 
7 To be precise, according to the World Bank classification (2013), 34 of these 36 are middle-income 
countries and only two (Bangladesh and Kenya) are low-income countries. However, the latter two 
countries have complete datasets and they do not differ materially, in terms of their income levels, from 
some of the middle-income countries (e.g., Ghana and Nigeria) hence we have included them in the 
analysis. We evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of Bangladesh and Kenya in Section 5. 
The focus is to include as many countries as possible that have a complete dataset.  
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8 The measures of FZ reported by Levine (2002) are unusually high – for example, FZ for Switzerland 
(Ln(5.51)), Japan (Ln(5.59)), US (Ln(5.24)) and UK (Ln(5.02)) imply very high ratios ranging from 
151(UK) to 247(Switzerland). The note to Table II (Levine, 2002) suggests that there may have been an 
error in computing FZ reported in Table II; hence, we do not compare FZ measures. If we were to 
compare, then big differences are clearly apparent.  
   
9 The negative effects of FA is an uncomfortable result but that is what the data tell us. As discussed 
above, our data are from a highly credible source. The original data, our construction and estimation 
codes will be available on request.  
 
10 Although finance size (FZ) appears positive and significant in one of the three cases, the financial 
services view emphasizes overall financial development – inclusive of FA and FZ – measured by FAG, 
hence the conclusion.    
 
11 One of the anonymous referees suggested that we evaluate if financial development (FD) and structure 
(FS) would affect financial and economic stability. We focus on economic stability simply because acute 
financial instability which exacerbates economic instability is of more concern. We proxy economic 
instability by growth volatility and compute: (i) five yearly moving standard deviation of real per capita 
GDP growth, (ii) ARCH (1) volatility of real per capita GDP growth, and (iii) the square of the residuals 
of equation (1) as a measure of the conditional volatility of real GDP per capita. All three volatility 
measures are stationary. Hence, we estimated fixed effects (OLS) models for each measure of growth 
volatility on FD  and FS  across all nine specifications as shown in Table 4. Results reveal that both 
covariates are insignificant across all specifications (robust standard errors are used). Thus, we do not find 
any evidence that financial development and structure explains growth volatility. 
 
12 We use lagged (one and two periods) values of explanatory variables as instruments. As stated above 
(footnote 5), our specifications do not include some of the covariates – such as schooling, inflation, black 
market premium etc. – used in the literature. Nevertheless, our specifications compare very favourably 
with Levine’s (2002) simple conditioning set which only includes initial income and schooling. 
